A federal judge in Florida on Thursday criticized the Trump administration’s immigration detention policies in one of his first official rulings since being confirmed earlier this month.
On Sept. 9, U.S. District Judge Kyle C. Dudek was confirmed by a 53-45 U.S. Senate vote. Dudek had previously served on the same bench; in 2022, he was selected by district judges in the Middle District of Florida to serve as a U.S. magistrate judge.
President Donald Trump nominated Dudek for the district judge role on May 28. He has now become one of Trump’s first second-term nominees to rule against the administration.
The ruling stems from a case concerning the Trump administration’s ongoing efforts to reshape how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) classifies certain immigrants.
Filed under seal, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was submitted on behalf of Marvin Hernandez Lopez, who was taken into custody and detained at the Glades County Detention Center — a facility that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has campaigned to close.
Although many case details remain confidential, Dudek cited key facts in granting a temporary restraining order:
“Lopez entered the United States illegally in 2013. He eventually got married, had children, and started a business. After a traffic stop in 2019, Lopez sought to legalize his immigration status…Lopez was apprehended by ICE on his way to work last month.”
Central to the case is 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), the statute ICE relies on for detention authority. Under this law, release from immigration detention is largely considered mandatory. The immigration judge who heard Lopez’s bond request denied it, citing mandatory detention.
However, Dudek ruled that the statute is incorrectly applied in cases like Lopez’s. Instead, § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) applies to long-term residents, allowing for release on bond or parole.
Dudek referenced the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez to support his ruling. The case distinguishes between arriving aliens under § 1225 and those already in the U.S. under § 1226(a), permitting parole for the latter.
“Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” Dudek noted. “Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.”
Applying this precedent, Dudek concluded that Lopez, a resident with family and business ties in the U.S., falls under § 1226(a).
“Against this backdrop, every court to address the question presented here has found that an alien who is not presently seeking admission and has been in the United States for an extended time, like Lopez, is appropriately classified under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b),” the order reads. “These courts have also either ordered the alien’s release or required a bond hearing—the exact relief Lopez seeks.”
Dudek further emphasized the need for immediate relief, warning that without it, Lopez could be deported or removed from the court’s jurisdiction, effectively eliminating any chance for recourse.
The temporary restraining order does not outright prohibit the use of § 1225(b) or mandate § 1226(a), since this relief mirrors Lopez’s underlying habeas petition. Nonetheless, the court’s ruling leans in favor of the plaintiff:
“Lopez has shown a substantial likelihood of success. Boiled down, Lopez alleges that he is unlawfully held under § 1225(b)(2), which mandates his detention, instead of under § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention scheme, where he could be eligible for release. And as a result, his continued detention without a bond hearing is unconstitutional.
“[T]he Court is only ordering that Lopez remain within its jurisdiction until his habeas petition is decided. So the harm to the Government is minimal. And because Lopez is arguably detained unlawfully under § 1225(b)(2), neither equity nor the public’s interest are furthered by holding him without the opportunity to seek release on bond.”
